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The paper is about Sanghamithra Rural Financial Services. It traces the growth of Sanghamithra 
from the time it was conceived till its completion of the fourth year of operations. It maps out 
how the strategic positioning of Sanghamithra has evolved and responded to external 
environment. It also traces the reasons for Sanghamithra to re-define its own role. 
 
Sanghamithra represents a unique experiment in the microfinance sector. It has important 
lessons on how an intermediary organisation can be structured, the impact it could have on the 
banking system, its own growth and sustainability. It raises issues of structuring organisations 
and also triggers a debate on whether the intent should be for-profit or not-for-profit. We 
conclude while the intent is important to choose the form of incorporation, while the nature of 
activities in itself does not dictate this intent and the consequent incorporation.  
 
We also discuss the issue of taxability. While there are arguments on the “charitable” nature of 
the operations of MFIs, we argue that these arguments are usually open to interpretation. If an 
institution has tax-free status as a non-negotiable part of its model, it may encounter regulatory 
roadblocks. This aspect is to be factored, while examining similar experiments.  
 
The paper also concludes that there is enough scope for an intermediary level organisation such 
as Sanghamithra to exist given the way the banking system is evolving and given the fairly 
inelastic nature of demand for credit vis-à-vis interest rates. It appears that access seems to be 
the prime concern while we deal with rural credit. However the paper recognises that this model 
is yet to build in a mechanism to collect “savings” of the clients. This is an issue worth pondering 
while structuring such intermediary organisations. 
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Building Bridges between the Poor and the Banking System 








Sanghamithra Rural Financial Services (Sanghamithra) was promoted by MYRADA an 
organisation working for rural development in South India. Before getting into the 
details of Sanghamithra, it may be important to understand the work of MYRADA in 
microfinance. This gives us a greater understanding of the challenges faced by 
Sanghamithra. MYRADA is a non-governmental organisation (NGO), which from its 
inception believed in building linkages between poor, people’s organisations, local 
institutions, state and other NGOs. The mission statement of MYRADA included the 
following aspect - to influence public policies in favour of the poor and to build 
supportive institutional linkages between official institutions and people’s organisations 
(Fernandez, 1998).  
 
MYRADA was one of the early innovators of the concept of self-help groups (SHG)
 2. The 
concept emerged in 1984-85, when MYRADA found that the banking system was not 
able to meet the needs of the poor. The banks were centralised, operated within specific 
guidelines and could not deal with the small client. That was when MYRADA 
experimented with SHGs. These SHGs were large enough for the bank to have 
transactions. The SHGs in turn were also very responsive and flexible to the needs of 
the members. While MYRADA did not believe in directly intervening in the credit market 
for the poor, they believed that the strategy had to go one step beyond “banking with 
the poor”. This step was towards “banking with institutions established and controlled by 
the poor”. The SHGs were a step in that direction. From 1984-85 onwards, for almost a 
decade MYRADA continued with this strategy of marrying the mainstream banking 
system with SHGs. In keeping with its mission, most of the efforts of MYRADA were in 
working with existing institutions like NABARD and conducting workshops for bankers on 
understanding and dealing with SHGs. However, one of the problems that MYRADA 
constantly faced with the bankers was that there was a sense of disbelief that SHGs 
could actually work and the banks transacting with SHGs could in fact make profits from 
this line of business. To counter this skepticism MYRADA had to have a working model 
that could demonstrate that banking with people’s institutions was indeed profitable. 
 
MYRADA also believed that NGOs were not suited to undertake this activity under the 
traditional form of incorporation as a charitable trust/society. For instance, even as late 
                                                 
1 Faculty Member, Centre for Management in Agriculture, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA). The 
research for this case study was carried out under the Sir Ratan Tata Fund for Research Collaborations in Microfinance 
instituted at IIMA. Contact at mssriram@iimahd.ernet.in. 
2 MYRADA started with Credit Management Groups (CMGs) and then recognizing the fact that these groups were 
performing a larger role than just credit management started using the term SHG. However, over a period of time, the 
term SHG got adopted into the mainstream nomenclature as NABARD embraced the concept. But the SHGs around the 
country as they are known largely perform the role of financial intermediation only. MYRADA believed that the groups 
promoted by them perform a larger social role and therefore called their groups as – Self-help Affinity Groups (SAGs). 
However for the purposes of this paper we use the term SHG uniformly. This includes old CMGs and the new SAGs 
promoted by MYRADA.    
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as 1998 the stated position of MYRADA was that it would not become a financial 
intermediary. MYRADA did not attempt to start a “Bank” which sooner or later would 
take on features that are standardised and centralised due to several factors, including 
the need to conform to banking norms (Fernandez, 1998). So, in the game plan of 
MYRADA there were banking institutions at one end providing financial services, and the 
poor at the other who would be unable to use these services due to inflexibilities in the 
system. The need was for an intermediary institution that would be flexible at the level 
of the poor and give a base level of comfort and professionalism to be a client of a 
proper bank. This gap was to be bridged by the SHGs. 
 
MYRADA identified that forming SHGs having an acceptable transaction size with the 
bank would not happen naturally. MYRADA believed that some of these costs were to be 
borne by the society at large – either through the state or through donor agencies. They 
identified three sets of activities that were necessary to bank with the poor.  
1.  Formation of SHGs, which had to be initiated by NGOs. Though MYRADA encouraged 
Banks – particularly the Cauvery Grameena Bank to form SHGs, they believed that 
the bankers would not have a sustained interest in this. 
2.  Training of SHGs – also to be done with an element of subsidy, though the subsidy 
could be graded over a period of time and full costs passed on to the SHGs. 
3.  Financial transactions – which was expected to be viable and the bankers should be 
interested in undertaking these activities.
3 
 
Rationale for establishing Sanghamithra 
 
When the activity of forming SHGs picked up, MYRADA realised that establishing linkage 
with the formal credit system was not simple. MYRADA identified that the traditional 
banking system had affected the credit culture in rural areas for three reasons: 
 
1)  The bank officials did not have long-term stakes in rural areas. Their orientation was 
urban. However, this was not the only reason for the poor getting a raw deal for, if 
this were the case, the urban poor should not have suffered. While the next two 
points apply to the poor in general, the rural poor were at a double disadvantage.  
2)  The borrowers were not convinced to maintain the credit-discipline because: 
a)  Bankers usually did not ask them to repay a loan 
b)  The state had occasionally asked them NOT to repay a loan
4 
3)  The average loan size was small, increasing the transaction costs per rupee lent. 
 
These led to a circularity of encouraging non-performing assets (NPAs) and citing NPA 
as a reason for not undertaking further lending. This led to a situation where,  
•  there was a demand for credit amongst the rural poor;  
•  there were resources in the banking system – through refinance schemes and own 
resources;  
•  there were regulations directing credit for vulnerable sections overtly through priority 
sector lending targets and covertly through subsidies; but 
•  the linkage between people needing credit and agencies supplying credit was failing. 
(Sriram, 2000) 
                                                 
3 Internal note by Fernandez to MYRADA staff dated August 20, 1993. 
4 Fernandez makes a poignant distinction between sala (meaning a loan in Kannada, the local language) and the term 
loan used by the poor. According to them, a loan is something that comes from the State and need not be repaid, 
while a sala is something that is borrowed locally and has to be necessarily repaid (Fernandez, 1998).    
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In addition, MYRADA also questioned its own rationale in wanting to start an 
independent organisation. The initial design was that if SHGs were formed and linked, 
the banks would see them as good customers and scale up lending. This was based on 
the assumption that the number of rural bank branches would expand. However, by 
1994 there was a growing realisation within MYRADA that with liberalisation and 
economic restructuring catching up, there was an increasing tendency to rationalise 
bank branches and consolidate operations. In this process the physical distance between 
a SHG and a bank branch increased. Therefore, linking SHGs to banks or having 
branches focussing on SHGs was not going to happen. The need to set up an 
independent entity that would bridge this gap was clearly seen
5. 
 
However the concept notes circulated within MYRADA stated that the proposed 
organisation would not be adding more tiers to the financial structure. The idea was to 
use this structure only to facilitate the loaning activities. The concept note even said that 
the financial services from head office to SHGs will be operated through bank accounts.
6 
 
Later, when Sanghamithra was established, and before it started operations, an internal 
workshop identified criteria for advancing loans to SHGs. One of the criterion was the 
SHG should have approached a bank branch with the same request and its application 
should be pending in the bank for at least four weeks or turned down for reasons that 





Sanghamithra was incorporated as a not-for-profit company in February 1995, under 
Section 25 of the Indian Companies Act of 1956. The objectives of Sanghamithra were: 
1.  To work with poor, reinforce their efforts to rise and remain above the poverty line. 
2.  To provide credit on interest or otherwise, to groups of poor persons who come 
together on the basis of affinity, both in rural and urban areas with the support of 
SHG promoting institutions. 
3.  To create replicable models in the area of financial services for the economically poor 
and socially exploited sections of the society in rural and urban India. 
4.  To support the rural and urban poor and to overcome poverty of all kinds (economic 
poverty, poverty of values and poverty of relationships with the people and 
organisations) through capacity building, skill development and attitudinal changes. 
5.  To encourage and collaborate with people and institutions with similar objectives. 
6.  To collaborate with the state, NGOs and to bring about changes in public policies 
and practices in favour of the poor and deprived, particularly in the areas of 
economic, fiscal and social administration. 
(Srinivasan, 2003). 
 
Even as it was incorporated and kept distinct from MYRADA, we see that the objectives 
were more interventionist and developmental than a financial intermediary. To address 
these objectives, was there a need to establish a new entity? Was it possible for 
MYRADA to undertake these activities? The answer to these questions is possibly hidden 
                                                 
5 Internal note by Fernandez to the staff dated September 29, 1994. 
6 Puhazhendhi, V (1993) Project Proposal for Establishment of a Financial Service for the Development of SHGs, Internal 
documents of MYRADA. 
7 MYRADA: Minutes of an internal workshop dated June 20, 1995.    
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in the second objective. MYRADA did not want to into commercial transactions. Though 
Sanghamithra was set up with broad brush objectives, the intent was to demonstrate 
that banking with the poor through SHGs was indeed profitable and sustainable. 
Therefore an institution having a distinct culture from the parent was necessary. It was 
a clean way of demonstrating. By keeping the balance sheet separate, the cross 
subsidization if any, could be avoided. If we look at the microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
across India, we find that only a few have taken this conscious decision of keeping the 
financial transactions away in a specialised entity. Usually we find that NGOs slowly get 
morphed into MFIs over a period of time, and the starting point is the financial 
intermediation they undertake on behalf of their beneficiary groups. 
 
The next natural question is – why was it set up as a not-for-profit company if it were to 
demonstrate profitability and sustainability? The answer possibly is in a mix of the 
following factors: 
 
1.  Legally MYRADA could not invest in the equity of Sanghamithra. Therefore 
capitalising the project would have been difficult as a for-profit entity. The people 
who conceived this institution were people who had spent a lifetime in working in 
the non-profit sector and therefore did not want to invest their personal resources in 
this company, as they were not looking for returns anyway. No external private 
investor would be interested in investing in a demonstration model, unless of course, 
the larger plan was to rapidly grow in this direction in the future. 
2.  Following from the above, funding was sought from developmental rather than 
commercial sources both for capitalisation and growth. Donor money could only flow 
in to not-for-profit entities. Sanghamithra was incorporated with zero equity – the 
liability of the entity limited by the guarantee provided by the promoter-members
8 as 
against investment of even a token amount of capital. 
3.  Since this was conceived as a demonstration model, there would be no pressure on 
aggressive growth plans. Therefore growth rates fuelled by internal accruals were 
sufficient. The need to access capital markets for growth was not there. 
4.  Keeping it as a not-for-profit entity avoided a possible strategic drift in the future, 
where the organisation having tasted early success wants to grow rapidly as a 
proper financial institution, and losing the initial developmental orientation. The basic 
objective of MYRADA was only to demonstrate and encourage existing players to 
participate in banking with the poor; not create parallel systems. 
5.  The thinking during that time also indicates this: “if the project succeeds and earns 
surpluses, these could be ploughed into training activities or even into activities 
required to form groups.”
9 This statement turned out to be providential, as the urban 
programme of Sanghamithra now pays partner NGOs an amount of Rs.5,000 for 
promotion and linking of these SHGs.
10 
 
Though Sanghamithra was established in 1995, it started its operations only in 2000. 
The delay was because of initial hurdles in getting donor money, and later there were 
                                                 
8 The term “member” is somewhat loosely used in the microfinance sector. Usually it refers to borrowers with current 
outstandings, and in several cases, borrowers who have been registered by the MFI. However, the term member in 
the context of a company specifically means a share-holder, who has subscribed to the capital of the company. In 
case of Sanghamithra, since there is no capital, all the promoters who have given a guarantee would be treated as 
members. When we use the term member in this paper, we are using the term in the context of a stakeholder-
promoter rather than in the sense of a client-beneficiary. 
9 Fernandez AP (1993): Internal note to the staff of MYRADA.  
10 M-Cril (2004): Risk Assessment Report of Sanghamithra Rural Financial Services.    
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regulatory hurdles. Following a major scam in the financial services sector in 1996-97, 
the regulations for carrying out the business of financial services by companies were 
reviewed through an amendment to the Reserve Bank of India Act, in 1997. Based on 
the changes effected in the Act, companies receiving public deposits and those that 
were in the principal business of financial services were expected to register with the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Stringent norms were laid to commence or carry on the 
business as a Non Banking Finance Company (NBFC). One of the norms imposed were 
that the companies classified as NBFCs had to have a minimum net owned fund of 
Rs.2.5 million. This was later increased to Rs.20 million. However Sanghamithra was 
designed without capital and the only way of achieving these amounts was by plough 
back of internal accruals. But in the new dispensation, Sanghamithra could not start 
business and therefore the possibility of internal accruals was almost ruled out.  
 
There was much correspondence between Sanghamithra and RBI on how Sanghamithra 
– which had “provision of financial services” as a part of its basic objects – should be 
treated. There was also some correspondence with the Income Tax department on the 
“charitable status” of the organisation and therefore the applicability of Income Tax. 
 
In January 2000, based on the recommendations of an expert group (NABARD, 1999), 
RBI issued an exemption for companies engaged in microfinance activities from the 
registration requirements applicable to NBFCs
11. The exemption recognised loans to 
SHGs as microfinance, and also recognised that not-for-profit companies could 
undertake microfinance activities. Interestingly the exemption did not extend to for-
profit companies involved in microfinance. In doing so, RBI obliquely recognized that 
some types of microfinancing activities could be legitimately recognized as “not-for-
profit”, and also laid out contours of what could be defined as microfinance. Though this 
was neither the first recognition nor the last statement on microfinance, it was very 
significant because it was the first time a notification was issued recognising 
microfinance activities beyond the traditional SHG-Bank linkage format. 
 
The exemption benefited Sanghamithra. Other players in microfinance were registered 
as Trusts and Societies and continued to function through this period. However, even 
after such a major exemption was granted based on a high power committee 
recommendation, there were hardly any companies operating, using this exemption. 
Apart from Sanghamithra and Indian Association of Savings and Credit (IASC), there is 
no microfinance programme worth a decent size being carried out under this norm. Even 
IASC is trying to establish a for-profit entity as most of its loaning activities go beyond 
the small loan size specified in the exemption clause. IASC may want to move out 
because its portfolio is largely in housing and loan sizes for housing are usually beyond 
the limit prescribed by RBI. However this exemption ensures that microfinance 
companies fall within certain very limited size and range of activities and therefore have 
to be isolated examples rather than large replicable models. 
 
Sanghamithra at that time was quite happy with the regulation as it served its 
objectives. However, they soon discovered the limitation of the regulation, when they 
tried to move slightly away from their model. Sanghamithra started it urban operations 
in late 2000. When the urban programme started, the urban unit wanted to explore 
better ways of reaching out to the clients. Thin included purpose based group lending 
                                                 
11 Reserve Bank of India (2000): Notification number Ref. DNBS.(PD).CC.No. 12 /02.01/99-2000 dated January 13, 2000.    
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such as education loan. In addition the urban unit wanted to understand the micro-
economics of doing individual loans and also try and change the structure of SHG loans 
by having DROP loans (deferred repayment of principal)
12. This meant that 
Sanghamithra was no longer exclusively working with groups.  
 
The object clause of Sanghamithra stated that they would work only with SHGs. The 
urban programme necessitated a change in the objects, and Sanghamithra wanted to 
introduce the following clause: 
 
“To provide direct finance with or without security, and with or without interest, to the 
poor, individually and jointly with one or more of others, who are not yet members of the 
SHGs, but do have, in the opinion of the Company, the potential to be organized into 
such Groups over a period of time.”
13 
  
However, the change in the objects clause was not permitted by the authorities. The 
letter stated: 
 
“… I am to inform you that your application … seeking amendment to the object clause…  
has since been… considered and I am to state that, the proposed object contemplates 
commercial activities as that of a NBFC. Your application is therefore rejected.”
14 
 
Therefore it was clear in the minds of the regulator that commercial lending, even if it 
were for poor was to be carried out by companies that are registered and regulated by 
the RBI. Since RBI explicitly provided exemption for group based lending, it was okay, 
but individual lending to a vulnerable group was a problem. Here, Sanghamithra being 
registered as a company was a handicap. MFIs registered as not-for-profit Trusts and 
Societies, do carry out activities mentioned in the amendment to the objects clause.  
 
Review of Operations 
 
In over three years of operation Sanghamithra has been able to break even, and make 
fair amount of profits. It has demonstrated to the banks that dealing with the poor is 
worthwhile; it has also systematically addressed other issues that have engaged the 
banks. It has demonstrated that, with appropriate procedures, it was possible to slash 
transaction costs and still deal with the poor. Within a short time, Sanghamithra has 
achieved an operational self-sufficiency (OSS) of 132%. If the donor money were to be 
costed on commercial terms they were still unable to service the capital, with a financial 
self-sufficiency (FSS) of 86%. However, considering the investments new organisations 
have to make in initial years, this is a fair figure and it will not be long before 
Sanghamithra gets this figure up to 100%.
15 It is important to highlight that these 
returns were achieved after paying bank charges for leveraging the banking 
infrastructure. If the banks were to do these activities themselves, the costs would be 
lower. The banks would be absorbing these costs on a marginal basis as the 
infrastructure would be in place. The cost of funds for banks would be lower than the 
figures used for Sanghamithra’s cost of capital – banks can access relatively low cost 
deposits – a window not available to Sanghamithra. 
                                                 
12 Personal note from Ramesh Ramanathan, Vice Chairman of Sanghamithra (2004) 
13 Annual Report of Sanghamithra for the year ending March 31, 2001. 
14 Annual Report of Sanghamithra for the year ending March 31, 2002. 
15 All the figures are based on the Risk Assessment report of M-Cril (2004).     
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An issue that the bankers were concerned was about NPAs. With a cumulative 
repayment rate of 98.9%, and a portfolio at risk (PAR) calculated with a conservative 
overdue cut off of 60 days showing 6.1%, there is reason to believe that this portfolio is 
performing very well in comparison to what the banks are used to. It is significantly 
better than the priority sector portfolio performance, and also better than the overall 
portfolio of the banks. Therefore Sanghamithra addressed two of the three issues that 
were raised earlier. The only issue that it did not address pertained to the attitude and 
orientation of the bankers, who come to the rural areas on brief assignments. 
 
Meeting such high performance standards was a result of some important policies and 
operating procedures that existed within Sanghamithra. We would like to discuss this to 
examine its replicability in the banks. This will provide explanations on why the banks 
are not lapping up this market in a way that one would have expected with the 
performance shown by Sanghamithra and other microfinance agencies. 
 
Sanghamithra achieved the above performance by following some unique procedures 
including: 
 
1.  Identifying the customers: 
This was done in close association with local community based organisations (CBOs). 
These organisations used participatory appraisal techniques in identifying client groups. 
By collaborating with CBOs, Sanghamithra created an institutional control mechanism.  
The loan disbursal was done by the SHG through a process of consultation. The 
involvement of a CBO was crucial because it provided a referral system. 
 
While the process of targeting the ultimate clients was left to SHGs, Sanghamithra did 
assessments, ensuring the safety of the money being lent. The process was as follows: 
•  First a CBO introduced the SHG. Based on a visit and appraisal, the credit officer 
determined and classified the SHG into three categories.  
¾  Category A: Ready to be linked; 
¾  Category B: Some parameters have to be met to be linked, but can achieve 
the standards with some inputs; and  
¾  Category C: Not suitable for linking at present.  
•  The category A groups were registered. The advantage of this system was that 
potential clients got to know where they stood and how they could qualify for 
linkage. This feedback put the burden of correction on the collaborating CBO. While 
this feedback was useful, it impaired Sanghamithra’s ability to seek and nurture 
category C clients.  
 
2.  Keeping the procedures simple 
The procedures followed by Sanghamithra were: 
•  Introduction by a CBO, visit by an officer for assessment. If the SHG was A category 
then they passed a resolution and applied for a loan. 
•  The decision to grant a loan was based on the recommendation and the data given 
by the credit officer.  
•  Once the decision was made, cheque was delivered to the SHG by the credit officer.  
•  The documentation was done at the time of delivering the cheque.    
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•  The interest incidence was from the date of the cheque and not from the date of 
handover. The date of handover preceded the date of the cheque. 
•  Keeping documentation simple – the objective of documentation was to establish 
that the money was disbursed on certain terms and conditions. Documentation was 
not done with an objective of going to court. Therefore back-ending all expenses 
pertaining litigation (which would be exceptional) was the strategy. This saved 
stamp duty on non-defaulting accounts (expected to be more than 98% cases) and 
in the unlikely event of default leading to litigation, imposed a penalty on those that 
actually sought legal recourse. 
 
3.  Keeping products and repayments simple 
The loans were usually in round figures. The terms of the loans were fixed in a manner 
that the instalments were easy to understand. All repayments were through post dated 
cheques. However, the contact with the SHGs had to be regular – therefore only two 
post-dated cheques were taken. Every time a cheque was banked, the SHG was 
informed to ensure that there was sufficient balance. While this ensured regular contact, 
it gave flexibility to Sanghamithra to use the cheque on the due date. The principle was 
to devise a product that could be rolled out fast and could be easily understood. 
 
Impact on the banking system 
 
While the objective of Sanghamithra was to demonstrate that with appropriate 
intermediary systems like SHGs, banking with the poor was possible, Sanghamithra itself 
was not designed to be self-liquidating. What would happen if Sanghamithra became 
successful in its objectives and the banking system took over? The answer is not simple. 
Sanghamithra may move to other geographies where the banking system had failed. It 
may reinvent itself as a financial intermediary; it may take up causes other than credit. 
The objects of Sanghamithra include provision of savings services so that the SHGs find 
a safe outlet to deposit their savings. Under the current regulation Sanghamithra is 
prohibited from taking group savings. The SHG model is built on the foundation of 
regular meetings, with savings providing a purpose for the meetings. Unless the issue of 
savings is addressed effectively the role of Sanghamithra would never be complete. 
 
Given the demonstration of Sanghamithra, the bankers should have been happy to take 
the cues and start lending in a big way to SHGs. The demonstration on how the housing 
portfolio has taken off across the banking system in this country shows that given 
reasonable assurance on the safety of the loans, the bankers are capable of lending to a 
segment considered “priority” on pure commercial considerations. Housing falls under 
the parameters of “priority sector”. Several banks like the ICICI Bank have lent far in 
excess of their target requirements, not because there is pressure, but they see this as 
an attractive commercial proposition. But did the banks see SHGs as an opportunity, at 
least in the areas where Sanghamithra operated?  
 
The response to this question is mixed. An impact assessment study indicated that the 
banks see Sanghamithra as competition and have responded both positively and 
negatively (Srinivasan, 2003). The positive response was in taking over the groups that 
were linked to Sanghamithra - offering them better terms. In addition the data indicated 
that the growth of SHG linkage by these banks was faster after Sanghamithra came into 
the market. The negative response was by creating hurdles to Sanghamithra. The    
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greatest efficiency of the chain – from Sanghamithra to the ultimate customers could not 
be greater than the weakest link. The most important link in the chain, is the banking 
system as Sanghamithra operates only through the banking system (cheque based 
transactions rather than cash based). Therefore the banking system could create 
problems in processing. It was apparent that the banks wanted to compete both in 
pricing and in relative efficiency.  
 
Sanghamithra should have been happy with this, and should have been moving on to 
other locations; withdrawing from locations where the banks were active. However, 
trends indicated that while banks recognised that they were losing out to Sanghamithra, 
they did not have a plan to pro-actively capture the market. Therefore, it was often 
found that when Sanghamithra reduced the intensity of its activity, the banks also 
slackened. This meant that the presence of Sanghamithra was required continually for 
the banking system to perform. 
 
Is it possible to understand the reluctance of the banks to take on the task of lending to 
SHGs and ensure that Sanghamithra leaves the field? After all Sanghamithra has 
demonstrated that the portfolio is attractive, has excellent repayment rates and is cost 
effective. In fact the banks may be more efficient in costs because they do not have 
overheads of the channel; they own the channel. 
 
The reason for the banks not taking SHG portfolio in a manner similar to the housing 
portfolio is to be traced to the nature of physical activity involved. The banks are used to 
operating from the counters – the activity is centralised. This is so with good reason – 
banking involves handling large amounts of cash on a day-to-day basis. This needs 
security and is to be done in a place with adequate infrastructure. The microfinance 
models, including the SHG models are de-centralised – they reach out to the clients in 
their setting. This change is a major paradigm shift for the banks. Even if one gets 
attitudinal changes in the banks, it might not be sufficient because adapting to the 
methods of microfinance means getting out of the counter. Banks having a diverse 
portfolio may not afford this change. We have examples like the Oriental Bank of 
Commerce having a specialised microfinance branch. But it might be difficult to open 
several such branches; and this may be the exception that proves the rule. 
 
The documentation and loaning procedures followed by Sanghamithra cannot be readily 
adapted by the banks as they are bound by larger guidelines. There would be need for a 
general exemption for dealing with microfinance clients for banks to adapt to the types 
of documentation of Sanghamithra. 
 
The staff of Sanghamithra cost much less than the average cost of bank personnel. This 
is a reality one has to live with. The only way the bankers can address the issue of costs 
is by outsourcing microfinance activity. For instance ICICI Bank has been quick to 
identify this opportunity and have started using institutions involved in microfinance as 
selling agents for their loans. This is not a model that all bankers may quickly adapt. 
 
Therefore, even though the portfolio looks attractive, it involves a major shift in the 
operating procedures of the banks. The banks may be unwilling to make the investment 
in the internal re-orientation. Since microfinance ultimately is a small part of the bank 
portfolio, it does not make sense for the bankers to make changes in the procedures.    
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The bank staff get transferred and move from branch to branch and division to division. 
So the procedures should therefore be easy to adapt and replicated mechanically across 
a large number of staff members. Unfortunately the procedures of microfinance are so 
unique that it is difficult to spread it across all staff members. Therefore we find that the 
success of SHG linkage programme in a given bank is person dependent; not system 
dependent. Till we can convert the activity to be system dependent, it is difficult to scale 
up, irrespective of the attractiveness of the portfolio. 
 
T h i s  r e a l i z a t i o n  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  c o m e  t o  Sanghamithra as well; and there is a new 
enthusiasm within Sanghamithra to grow. For a long time, Sanghamithra did not get an 
assessment done by a rating agency, did not draw down a loan that was approved by 
the SIDBI Foundation for Micro Credit (SFMC) and maintained that they keep the 
portfolio of a reasonable size that makes the banks perform. But, much the way 
MYRADA discovered that awareness and sensitisation workshops were to be followed by 
demonstration, Sanghamithra also realised that demonstration had to be followed up by 
competition. 
 
We have to recognise that there were other changes in the economy. When 
Sanghamithra started, the interest rates charged to the SHGs were comparable to the 
banks. It was an explicit policy as Sanghamithra wanted to demonstrate that the model 
works within the constraints of the banking system where interest rates are decided 
centrally (Sriram, 2002). However over the past years interest rates have fallen 
significantly. Sanghamithra did not effect a change in its rates during these years. This 
meant that Sanghamithra could source commercial funds at a cheaper rate and leverage 
on the relative inelasticity of interest rates at the SHG level. This helped Sanghamithra 
to reach out to a larger number of SHGs. Most of the banks still find that SHG as a unit 
of transaction is much better than individual clients. However, the transaction intensity 
and the amount of attention to be devoted to these clients is far higher than what the 
margins justify. If a bank could get a large portfolio of clusters of SHGs through the 
consolidated outlet of Sanghamithra, it might be worth forgoing the costs and returns of 
retail, and get lower risk free margins on a bulk transaction. This was what happened. 
The benefit of lower interest rates resulted in a greater access to loans and the arbitrage 
margins went to friendly intermediaries like Sanghamithra. 
 
This development was also helped by the relaxation of the policy of RBI vis-à-vis lending 
to microfinance. The reforms initiated by RBI were on two counts.  
1.  The interest rates applicable to loans given by banks to MFIs or by MFIs to 
SHGs/member beneficiaries was totally left to their discretion.  
2.  The banks were given freedom to formulate their own model[s] or choose any 
conduit/intermediary for extending microcredit. Microcredit extended by banks to 




Both these encouraged banks to look at organisations like Sanghamithra as 
intermediaries that help them to build their portfolio on a bulk basis rather than enter 
                                                 
16 Inaugural address by Shri Vepa Kamesam, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India at a seminar on “Indian Economic 
Scenario – Yesterday-Today-Tommorrow – Banking-Agriculture-Industry-IT – New Hopes-New Challenges” organized 
by Telugu Vaibhavam at Hyderabad on September 16, 2003 
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into small transactions. This also went hand in hand with the banks’ own rationalization 
of branch network and cost and profitability concerns. 
 
Interestingly banks that were enthusiastic in financing Sanghamithra, were not the ones 
that were competing with them at the local level. There were three strong Regional 
Rural Banks (RRB) - Cauvery Grameena Bank, Chitradurga Grameena Bank and 
Adhiyaman Grameen Bank - competing with Sanghamithra in the area. The banks that 
were willing to fund Sanghamithra’s rural operations were Corporation Bank and Canara 
Bank. These two banks were not the sponsor banks of the above RRBs. The divide 
between the commercial banks and RRBs was therefore clear. RRBs in the area saw 
SHGs as their clients, and were competing with Sanghamithra. The commercial banks 
had other interests and were happy to allow Sanghamithra to get them the portfolio on 
a wholesale basis. 
 
The question then is why should Sanghamithra continue in an area if banks are willing 
to lend? Would it not be wiser for Sanghamithra to move to other areas and 
demonstrate? According to Sanghamithra, the performance of the RRBs did not show 
enough maturity for them to withdraw. They also felt that the penetration of the RRBs 
was not sufficient and therefore there was scope for Sanghamithra to co-exist and 
compete. This was a competition between a non-resident commercial bank shooting 
from the shoulder of Sanghamithra at a RRB. Eventually RRBs would have an advantage 
due to their local presence, but they have to make a cultural shift in operating 
procedures. This could be a long haul. 
 
Plans of Sanghamithra 
 
What should be the strategy of Sanghamithra in the long run? If the gap between the 
poor and the banking system is expected to continue in various shades for a long time, 
it may be necessary for them to continue and grow. With the new bottomline orientation 
it is not clear how the banking system will respond in the long run. If the trends are to 
be believed, there might be rationalization of the branches, opening up more space for 
organisations like Sanghamithra. 
 
Sanghamithra did not plan to grow into a financial supermarket. They recognised that 
their strength was in being small and agile. Therefore, while MYRADA has been thinking 
o f  o p e n i n g  m o r e  S a n g h a m i t h r a  l i k e  c o m p a n i e s .  E a c h  c o m p a n y  w o u l d  g r o w  u p  t o  a  
portfolio size of Rs.250 million.  
 
While Sanghamithra has made an intervention in the credit market, there is a larger 
market of savings that needs intervention. As per the regulations it is not possible for 
Sanghamithra to do anything now. The SHGs collect savings and use if for rotation. 
There is no outlet to park idle funds of SHGs except the Banks. In most cases savings 
precede credit and that is the place where most SHGs in formative stages hit a 
roadblock. The banks were unwilling to open accounts and SHGs are faced with attitude 
problems of the bank officials. Sanghamithra has to achieve this breakthrough in future. 
 
The urban challenge is different. While MYRADA and Sanghamithra have a good 
understanding of the problem of rural credit, the challenge with urban microfinance is 
different. The banks may not respond in the same manner as the rural banks have    
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responded. In urban areas, we do not have many neighbourhood banks – though 
several urban co-operative banks could potentially fit the bill. The commercial banks, 
particularly the new generation private sector banks, which are willingly lending in bulk 
to the microfinance sector, are not keen to have the retail clients on their books. The 
banks have been increasing the minimum deposit required to open a savings account 
and imposing transaction charges on the customers. This has made small transactions 
untenable. Therefore the contours of the challenge in urban microfinance are going to 
be significantly different. Sanghamithra has to cope with it. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of Sanghamithra’s strategic role 
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Based on the study we discuss issues on regulation that arises out of this model. One 
question is whether the function of financial intermediation is to be done by not-for-
profit entities. While this falls very much in place in the context of MYRADA-
Sanghamithra, should this be taken forward as a general principle? What are the merits 
and de-merits of having not-for-profit entities in financial intermediation? 
 
In the case of Sanghamithra, two issues of regulation were encountered.  
1.  Recognition as a company engaged in financial services; and 
2.  Exemption of income tax for revenue arising out of operations. 
 
As a company engaged in provision of financial services – particularly credit to the poor 
borrowers, Sanghamithra was no different from any other financial institution. The basic 
parameters of financial institutions are that they get money from certain sources – 
usually equity and borrowings. The borrowings are further classified as borrowings from 
institutional sources such as banks and from retail sources such as individual depositors. 
The money thus obtained is deployed as loans to the poor, for infrastructure and for 
expenses. The money deployed as loans is then recovered with interest or service 
charge, and the liabilities are eventually discharged. Inherently there is no element of 
“charity” involved. It is just a question of whether the interest/service charge levied is 
reasonable or not. The reasonableness is determined in the context in which the 
organisation is operating. Therefore strictly speaking it does not matter whether the 
form of incorporation is actually “for-profit” or “not-for-profit”.  
 
However, the edifice of regulation by the central banker – the RBI – is based on the 
premise that parties interested in earning a margin and also enhancing value to the 
investors. Here, financial transactions of a large number of people are involved and the 
transactions happen on a sustained and continual basis. This is unlike other businesses 
where the transaction terminates on the sale and settlement of an exchange. This could 
be a one-time transaction. The financial institutions therefore need greater regulation. 
 
Regulation at a broad level would be to look at stability of the organisation to have 
ongoing transactions. If the financial intermediary is involved only in loaning activities, 
and is sourcing funds from institutional players, the risk to the deposits of the retail 
depositor is non existent. Therefore the amount of regulation required here is lower. The 
success of the business and the safety of the funds of institutions depend on the 
financial intermediaries like Sanghamithra making appropriate commercial judgements 
on loans to be given and a follow up to collect the loans. Therefore the regulators have 
felt that the stakes of the investors have to be at a certain level, to ensure that they 
have sufficient amounts of their own resources at risk. This is translated into the norm 
of capital adequacy. This ensures that the promoters do not leverage themselves and 
put other people’s money at stake, while their own losses could be minimal.  
 
At a broad level, when a financial intermediary is sourcing funds only from institutional 
players, the assumption is that these players are mature enough to take an informed 
decision on lending to the intermediary. However, if there are a large number of small 
depositors at the retail level putting in money, then they as a body cannot exercise    
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effective control or take informed decisions because of their size. In such a situation the 
role of the regulator is enhanced. 
 
In case of Sanghamithra, the problem was peculiar. It was possible for them to organise 
a company without any financial stakes of the promoters. This was because anybody 
could set up a not-for-profit company to undertake developmental activities. The 
companies act also did not specify a minimum capital – therefore the liabilities of the 
members of Sanghamithra were limited by guarantee. Now, if such a company wanted 
to do financial intermediation, is it qualified under the general commercial norms? 
Obviously not. The issue is again not whether the ultimate returns were to be distributed 
to the members or not. The issue was whether the stakes of the members of the 
company was sufficient enough for them to leverage external borrowings. Since not-for-
profit entities, having very low capital operating in the arena of microfinance was 
common, RBI had to take a view on this. The teport of the task force (NABARD, 1999) 
and its recommendation for review of policy, came in handy for RBI to specifically 
exempt certain types of organisations from adhering to the rather stringent norms 
applicable to companies undertaking financial intermediation. Therefore RBI had to have 
distinguishing markers for what it would define as “microfinance”. A convenient marker 
that the RBI found was that microfinance institutions usually dealt with groups and not 
individuals. This was sufficient for them to use as a distinctive feature from individual 
based money lending models that were to be regulated. It suited Sanghamithra because 
this was the model that they were following. It only posed a problem when 
Sanghamithra wanted to try individual lending. Here they could not get their objects 
clause amended to lend to individuals and at the same time enjoy the exemption from 
the regulation applicable to finance companies. 
 
While there is evidence to the contrary where organisations having very low capital 
base, depending largely on donated/borrowed funds having done very well and grown – 
it would be still desirable as a general principle to have capitalisation norms for the 
financial structure to ensure a minimum involvement from the promoters. We shall deal 
with the issue of how organisations promoted by developmental professionals who do 
not have access to commercial capital elsewhere. 
 
The issue emnating from the above discussion is that the ultimate objective of whether 
the organisation is structured as “for-profit (distribution)” or “not-for-profit” is not 
germane for doing financial intermediation. However, as a matter of general principle, 
structurally it is necessary to maintain promoter stakes and ensure capital adequacy. 
 
The second issue is pertaining to taxability of the income. This is a larger issue and here 
the “commercial” nature of activity comes into play. What is commercial, therefore 
largely turns out to be a matter of interpretation. One school of thought refers to the 
possibility of distributing profits, or residual claims to the members of the organisation. 
The other more conservative view is whether the inherent activity is “charitable” or 
“commercial” in nature. One of the arguments laid out by an advocate commissioned by 
Sanghamithra was that the tax status is to be established by the criteria on whether the 
organisation is serving to obtain private profit. He had argued that there is no need to 
exempt an organisation that makes no income… and therefore by the very nature of 
granting explicit exemption, one is recognising that income is accruing, but tax is not 
being imposed. His opinion was that as long as the organisation does not distribute    
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dividend, and as long as all property is used for charitable purposes as laid out be the 
objects of the trust, there should be no doubt about the exempt status of the 
organisation for the purposes of taxation
17.  
 
While the argument was tenable, it took some effort by Sanghamithra to convince the 
tax authorities, before they could get an exemption. This exemption was obtained 
before RBI defined what microfinance was for its regulatory purposes. Now that the RBI 
definition of what could be construed as microfinance being readily available, the 
taxation interpretation may also follow suit, but we have to recognise that this is still an 
issue that officers of the income tax department might interpret either way. 
 
Concluding Notes: Implications for scaling up and replication 
 
How is the Sanghamithra model useful to us for large scale replication of microfinance in 
India? This question helps us to focus and decide if the strengths were specific to the 
promoters of Sanghamithra or if they were system driven. Conceptually, this model 
followed logic. It did not believe in replicating structures, used existing structures and 
encouraged banks to actively participate in building linkages with the poor. It acted as 
an intermediary demonstration model. Since it was not-for-profit, there was scope to 
plough back residual revenues for the development of new groups, expand and deepen 
the client base. However this model was based on the assumption that NGOs would be 
interested forming SHGs and linking them. Fernandez has explicitly stated that 
“formation of groups cannot pay for itself.. these interventions therefore will have to be 
provided by NGOs….”.
18 One could therefore say that if NGOs are willing to bear the cost 
of investing in groups, the model should be able to run on its own steam. This also 
precludes the banks promoting SHGs under the assumption that the process of SHG 
formation and training is intensive if quality was to be achievee. There are arguments 
that the cost of SHG formation has to be paid by the bankers and it could be recovered 
in due course, but MYRADA’s did not believe so. 
 
The second issue is of intermediation by an institution like Sanghamithra. It is evident 
from their performance that there was space for an intermediary organisation that could 
pay for itself. The question of whether this should be membership based or externally 
induced is open. Possibly there is scope for a federal organisation of the SHGs to 
eventually operate in the place of Sanghamithra. That form is left to individual 
preferences, but it might be difficult for other promoters to get a tax-exempt, 
microfinance company to operate, since a part of whether certain objects of the entity 
are tenable as charitable activity or not, are tax exempt or not are subject to open 
interpretations. The precedence of Sanghamithra can be used by other organisations. 
                                                 
17 Sarangan, G, 1994: Note to MYRADA, internal documents of MYRADA. 
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